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I. INTRODUCTION
To function effectively, market economies must efficiently process those
businesses that inevitably fail because of the market's workings. Our
economy absorbs between $35 million and $41 million to liquidate the
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approximately 30,000 businesses that file chapter 7 each year.' As large as
these figures are, they do not include the businesses that file bankruptcy
under other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code such as chapter 11 or 13, nor do
they account for any consumer bankruptcies, nor do they include the
resolution of economic distress outside of formal bankruptcy proceedings.
A dearth of empirical data has not slowed the debate regarding the
efficiency of the nation's bankruptcy laws. The National Bankruptcy Review
Commission has just released its 1400-page report calling for numerous
revisions in the federal bankruptcy law, including changes that would speed
the bankruptcy process because of perceptions the current system takes too
long and costs too much.2 The academic community also has debated the
efficiency of our bankruptcy system in law review articles.3 In the final
analysis, the issue boils down to one of utility: do the benefits of our current
system outweigh its costs or the net benefits of any reasonable alternative?
There is little information available to solve this equation.
This paper represents the first attempt to quantify the costs of business
liquidations. Three years ago we published a study concerning fifty-seven
small-business chapter 7 and chapter 11 cases from Memphis, Tennessee.4
1. The figures in the text are approximations, extrapolated from the data in this paper and other
sources. The most recent figures from the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts show 7494 chapter 7
business for the quarter ended December 31, 1996, or about 30,000 filings a year. We found median
chapter 7 distributions to be $65,615 (see infra Table 3) and the median chapter 7 to have costs of
2.1% of distributions (see infra Table 4, Panel A). Multiplying these numbers together would represent
$41,338,080 in total costs nationwide.
Using assets as a measuring point produces a slightly different estimate. We found the median
chapter 7 case to report $107,602 in total assets at filing (see infra Table 3) and to report costs of 1.1%
of total assets (see infra Table 4, Panel A). Again using the figure of 30,000 business chapter 7 filings
each year, these numbers would represent $35,508,660 in total costs nationwide. We use median
figures here because our analysis suggests they are more representative of the sample than the mean.
2. See NATIONAL BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, FINAL REPORT-BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT
TWENTY YEARS (1997).
3. The law reviews have supported a cottage industry in bankruptcy theory. Any collection of
materials will suffer from omission. A few examples include Barry Adler, Finance's Theoretical
Divide and the Proper Role of Insolvency rules, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1107 (1994); Douglas G. Baird,
Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Rely to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815 (1987); Michael Bradley
& Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992); Donald R.
Korobkin, Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law, 71 TEX. L. REV. 541
(1993); Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government: Whose Money Is It
Anyway?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 993 (1995); Robert L Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy
Rules and Social Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 1; Charles J. Tabb, The Future of Chapter 11, 44 S.C.
L. REV. 791 (1993); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in the Real World, 92 MICH. L. REV.
336 (1993); and Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987).
4. See generally Robert M. Lawless et al., A Glimpse at Professional Fees and Other Direct
Costs in Small Firm Bankruptcies, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 847. Although Bluebook citation form "et al."
deprives all our co-authors their due, we will not. We were joined in the pilot study by Professor
Narayanan Jayaraman of the Georgia Institute of Technology and by Professor Anil K Makhija of the
University of Pittsburgh.
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We lamented the generally poor empirical knowledge of small-business
bankruptcy 5 and sought to provide a glimpse at the direct costs involved with
them. Unfortunately, the breadth of our study was limited due to insufficient
resources. We were able only to examine cases from one judicial district.
The previous study evolved into a pilot project for a more intensive
examination of small-business bankruptcies. This paper is the product of the
larger examination. Here we provide a comprehensive look at direct costs
associated with chapter 7 business bankruptcy liquidations by examining
cases from five geographically dispersed judicial districts. A later paper will
examine direct costs in chapter 11 reorganizations. Together, these papers
will complete one side of the utility equation for business bankruptcies and
provide a greater understanding of the direct costs of business bankruptcy.
6
Comparisons between chapter 7 and chapter 11 costs must be done with
extreme caution. Chapter 7 and chapter 11 are different proceedings with
different goals: a chapter 7 bankruptcy results in liquidation, while a chapter
11 proceeding results in reorganization. One might observe, for example, that
chapter 11 costs tend to be a lower percentage of distributions or assets
administered than in chapter 7 cases.7 Such a finding hardly means that
chapter 11 is more "efficient" than chapter 7 any more than one might say a
less expensive criminal trial is more "efficient" than a costly civil
proceeding. In both settings, the proceedings are not alternatives to each
other; each proceeding may be appropriate in a given set of circumstances.
Empirical data about costs alone does not allow us to draw conclusions about
the relative efficiency of each proceeding.
To measure bankruptcy costs, one must determine a metric that allows for
comparison between cases. For example, $20,000 may be excessive to
liquidate a small retail store, but the same amount may be insufficient to
liquidate a large heavy-manufacturing firm. To account for firm size, this
article standardizes costs by assets reported at filing and distributions to
5. See generally Teresa Sullivan et al., The Use of Empirical Data in Formulating Bankruptcy
Policy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (1987).
6. The question of consumer chapter 7 bankruptcy costs is beyond the scope of this paper. For
our study, we selected only those cases where the debtor had identified itself as a business filer. In
many of these cases, individual debtors with a sole proprietorship filed with a significant amount of
consumer debt and assets. Nevertheless, their filings were primarily characterized by business debt,
and the debtor identified itself as a business filer. One must be cautious, therefore, in drawing
conclusions about consumer bankruptcy costs from this paper, our findings might not hold for filers
who identify themselves as consumers. Those interested in empirical data about consumer
bankruptcies generally should consult the landmark study: TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (1989).
7. See, e.g., Lawless, supra note 4, at 862, 863-68 (reporting average chapter 7 costs of 69% of
distributions to nonsecured creditors versus 26% in chapter 11).
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creditors. Thus, we report chapter 7 direct costs as 0.135 (13.5%) of
distributions or as 0.061 (6.1%) of total assets. Where this article refers to
costs, it generally denotes costs measured relative to size (either assets or
distributions). However, this article may also at times describe direct costs in
absolute terms (e.g. $4609).
This article measures chapter 7 direct costs, which are essentially out-of-
pocket administrative costs associated with chapter 7 proceedings. Examples
of direct costs include attorneys' fees, filing fees, and other professional fees.
Of course, chapter 7 may also carry indirect costs such as the loss of
revenues, the loss of investment opportunities, and the loss of goodwill. One
can only observe indirect costs inferentially, however, such as by observing
the loss of firm value that accompanies a business bankruptcy filing.8
Quantifying the indirect costs of small-business bankruptcy may be
impossible because small businesses by definition lack a securities market
that constantly revalues their equity. Nevertheless, those interested in
assessing chapter 7 bankruptcy from a societal viewpoint must account for
both its direct and indirect costs.
Many scholars have explored the direct costs of larger business
bankruptcies. 9 As informative as these studies are, they are like "looking
under the streetlight."'10 It is relatively easy to calculate bankruptcy costs
incurred by large, publicly-traded companies, given the vast amounts of
8. See, e.g., Gregor Andrade & Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly Is Financial (not Economic)
Distress?: Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed (unpublished
manuscript on file with author) (estimating financial distress costs to be 10-23% of firm value); David
M. Cutler & Lawrence H. Summers, The Costs of Conflict Resolution and Financial Distress:
Evidence from the Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation, 19 RAND J. ECON. 157, 161 (1988) (using decline in
firm value to estimate that Texaco's bankruptcy cost the company $697.5 million in indirect costs); see
also Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency:
Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L. REV. 295 (1989) (exploring reasons for loss of value in
Pennzoil/Texaco litigation).
9. See, e.g., Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost
Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067 (1984); James S. Ang et al., The Administrative Costs of Corporate
Bankruptcy: A Note, 37 J. FIN. 219 (1982); Daryl M. Guffey & William T. Moore, Direct Bankruptcy
Costs: Evidence from the Trucking Industry, 26 FIN. REV. 223 (1991); Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy
Costs: Some Evidence, 32 J. FIN. 337 (1977); Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolutions: Direct
Costs and Violations of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285 (1990); Michelle J. White,
Bankruptcy Costs and the New Bankruptcy Code, 38 J. FIN. 477 (1983).
10. Every empiricist is familiar with the story of looking under the streetlight. The story begins
with a person crouched under a streetlight. Another person approaches and asks what the first person is
doing. "I am looking for my ring I dropped across the street," the first person responds. "Why," the
second person asks, "are you looking here if you dropped the ring across the street?" To which the first
person answers, "Because the light is better over here."
The tale is a cautionary one for empiricists. The light may be better under the streetlight, but the
person in the story will never find her ring. Empiricists are often tempted to explore under the
streetlight, to use data because it is readily available rather than the best available.
[voL. 75:1207
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information readily available. However, as we have previously stated, these
only provide us with studies of what is already largely known. Bankruptcy
legislators and policymakers have little information about the typical
business bankruptcy that occurs outside Wall Street's glare. Without
engaging in an intensive review of court files, information about small- and
medium-sized business bankruptcies has been unavailable.
Five additional parts follow this introduction. Part II describes the
procedures we followed in gathering data. Part II also sets forth several
assumptions we made when describing direct costs. Each time an assumption
needed to be made, we took the assumption that produced the lowest
bankruptcy costs. Accordingly, the data in this paper is a conservative
estimate of chapter 7 costs. Part I describes the characteristics of the debtors
and cases in our sample. In Part IV, discusses the actual cost measurements
and quantifies the costs of chapter 7 business bankruptcy. Part V uses
statistical analysis to identify determinants of chapter 7 costs. Part VI
summarizes our major conclusions.
II. DATA GATHERING AND PROCEDURES
Our goal was to collect as much reliable data as possible within the
constraints of our budget. Because the most accurate information would
come only from reading actual bankruptcy case files, our data gathering
methods were necessarily expensive and time intensive. We estimate that it
cost approximately $55 to identify, gather, and process the necessary
documents from one bankruptcy case, for a total of $5390 to gather the
ninety-eight chapter 7 cases in the study. Each file took approximately two
hours to process for a total of 196 person-hours.' These figures do not
include overhead costs such as computer time, nor do they account for time
spent planning and coordinating data gathering. Furthermore, these figures
understate the true financial costs because several people generously donated
their time or gave us discounts to help us in our research.
Despite the cost, it was important for our sample to be geographically
diverse, both in terms of the law practice environment and physical location.
We wanted to see if the results in our pilot study would hold across the
11. Although the amount of time spent on any one case file varied greatly depending on size and
complexity, rough estimates of an average are possible. A research assistant at the law school spent
approximately one hour making a preliminary review of each file and entering preliminary data
figures. One of the authors then would examine each file for accuracy and consistency, a process that
took approximately an average of forty-five minutes per chapter 7 file. Finally, a graduate assistant at
the business school would spend another fifteen minutes per case file entering the figures into a
computer.
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country. Toward that end we identified six cities (in six different federal
judicial districts) from which to pull case files: Atlanta (Northern District of
Georgia), Boston (District of Massachusetts), Kansas City (Western District
of Missouri), Peoria (Central District of Illinois), St. Louis (Eastern District
of Missouri), and Seattle (Western District of Washington). These six
locations included cases from small, medium, and large cities located in both
urban and rural environments. In addition, the six locations were
geographically dispersed throughout the country.
In each jurisdiction, we were able to gain the active cooperation of both
the bankruptcy bench and the bankruptcy court clerk's office. We found the
federal bankruptcy system's judges and court personnel more than willing to
help our study and expand society's understanding of how the bankruptcy
system operates. Our study would not have been possible without this
assistance, for which we are most appreciative.
There were other, secondary factors that motivated our choice of cities.
First, one or both of us had personal ties to all six cities, which allowed us to
find and hire clerical assistance in each location. Second, we chose both
Kansas City and St. Louis to provide information most relevant for the
taxpayers that support our institution (the University of Missouri-Columbia)
and our grant sponsor (the University of Missouri Research Board). Third,
we chose cities where we were able to gain the cooperation of the local
bankruptcy court. Although these other factors influenced our ultimate
choice of cities, our primary goal was to maintain geographical diversity as
discussed in the text.
Our decision to sample randomly from cases in specific geographic areas
is generally consistent with the approach suggested by Professor Teresa
Sullivan, a noted sociologist who has applied the statistical techniques of her
discipline to the study of bankruptcy. As she notes, a true random sample
would require the researchers to pull files simultaneously all over the
country, a logistic and financial nightmare. 12 A realistic and attainable but
methodologically sound compromise is to select a number of judicial districts
for particular characteristics and pull a random sample from each district.13
Upon our request, each bankruptcy clerk's office generated a list of
chapter 7 business cases that had closed within the past three years. We used
the debtor's characterization of whether the case was "business" or
"consumer." If the debtor checked the box on the petition indicating he, she,
or it had primarily business debt, we considered the case to be a chapter 7
12. See Teresa Sullivan, Methodological Realities: Social Science Methods and Business
Reorganizations, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1291, 1297 (1994).
13. See id. at 1297-1300.
[VOL. 75:1207
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business case. From the complete list of cases, we randomly generated a
smaller list to screen cases that did not meet the criteria for inclusion in our
study.
To be included in our study, a chapter 7 case must have been closed,
physically-available at the clerk's office, and have at least one distribution to
a secured or unsecured creditor. Although we would have preferred not to
limit our study to files that were physically available, it was a constraint we
had to accept given the resources available to us. Moreover, in our pilot study
we used a similar technique and found no selection bias.' 4 We defined
"distribution" quite broadly to mean any transfer of value from the
bankruptcy estate to a creditor. For example, distributions include orders
granting relief from the stay15 so a secured creditor may foreclose on its
collateral. We also included any instance where the bankruptcy trustee
abandoned assets of the estate with the apparent intent of allowing a secured
creditor to foreclose its lien on the asset. In these cases, we valued the
secured creditor's distribution at either the amount of the debt or the amount
the debtor listed as the asset's value in the schedules, whichever was lower.
By including cases where collateral was surrendered to secured creditors, our
study includes many chapter 7 cases often excluded as "no-asset" cases.
16
To identify cases meeting our criteria, we used the Public Access to Court
Electronic Records ("PACER") system. The PACER system allowed us
remote access to bankruptcy court dockets from our own desktop.
Unfortunately, the historical PACER records in Peoria contained only case
14. See Lawless, supra note 4, at 853 & n.19 (finding no selection bias based on interviews with
court personnel and on statistical tests).
15. Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, the "automatic stay" comes into effect. See 11
U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994). Although a number of detailed statutory provisions define and limit the
automatic stay's scope, generally the stay prohibits anyone from taking an action adverse to the
debtor's interest. The automatic stay essentially is the equivalent of a court injunction that comes into
effect "automatically" upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. For example, the automatic stay would
prohibit a creditor from collecting a prepetition debt or from foreclosing on collateral. Under certain
circumstances, set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), a creditor may move for relief from the automatic stay,
a procedure known as "lifting the stay." A classic example occurs when a secured creditor receives
relief from the stay to foreclose on collateral that is depreciating in value.
16. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION: CASE RECEIPTS
PAID TO CREDITORS AND PROFESSIONALS 1-2 & n.3 (1994) (counting only "asset cases," defined as
cases in which there are proceeds from nonexempt assets to distribute) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
Because of the differences in the data selection between our study and this GAO study,
comparisons must be made with caution. For example, the GAO found that payments to professionals
averaged 28.1% of all disbursements paid in chapter 7 asset cases. See id. at 40 (table 111.3). For our
cases, we report a figure of 13.5%. See infra Table Four. These figures are not inconsistent. Our figure
compares bankruptcy costs to all distributions, including secured creditor distributions, but the GAO
only included distributions to unsecured creditors and professionals. In other words, our denominator
includes things not present in the GAO denominator.
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descriptions, as opposed to full docket information. Faced with the prospect
of several nights in Peoria and expensive search costs, we decided it was
most prudent to drop Peoria from the chapter 7 portion of our study. Such
cost-benefit tradeoffs are inevitable in empirical work. The resources we
would have spent in Peoria may have jeopardized other portions of our
chapter 7 and chapter 11 study. In Seattle, PACER identified only eighteen
cases that met our selection criteria.1 7 Consequently, there were ninety-eight
remaining case files from five judicial districts to study.
We contracted for clerical help in each city, with the exception of Kansas
City where we did the work ourselves. As we directed, our assistant sent us
photocopies of documents that we identified from the electronic case docket
for each case. Then, using the docket and the photocopies we would cull data
for entry onto five pages of forms, a research assistant completed the initial
data entry. One of the authors then reviewed each file for accuracy and
consistency. Subsequently a business school graduate student entered the
data into a computer.
III. THE CASES AND THE DEBTORS
Our selection methods resulted in a diverse and representative sample of
chapter 7 cases. The sample characteristics are described in Table One. The
sample is distributed across five different districts with a reasonable
geographical dispersion. Both coasts are represented as well as the nation's
midsection. With the exception of Seattle, an equal number of cases are
drawn from each district. Within the constraints of our budget, we avoided
any regional bias that may be present in the magnitude of direct costs.
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Table One
A. Geographical Distribution of the Sample
District Number of Cases
Atlanta 20
Boston 20
Kansas City 20
Seattle 18
St. Louis 20
17. Periodically, each bankruptcy court ships its closed files to a federal archives warehouse. The
Seattle bankruptcy court made such a shipment shortly before we contacted them. Consequently, when
we conducted our PACER analysis in Seattle, there was a smaller list of cases from which to select
[VOL. 75:1207
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B. Temporal Distribution of the Sample
Number of Cumulative Cumulative
Year Cases Number Percent Percent
1991 1 1 1.0 1.0
1992 30 31 30.6 31.6
1993 46 77 46.9 78.6
1994 17 94 17.3 95.9
1995 4 98 4.1 100.0
C. Days Spent in Bankruptcy: A District Comparison
District Mean Median Maximum Minimum
All Districts 392 335 1146 91
Atlanta 313 176 829 100
Boston 378 353 785 110
Kansas City 324 268 733 91
Seattle 440 468 822 119
St. Louis 507 369 1146 98
F-stat: 1.880 (0.101)
Chi-Square: 5.955 (0.202)
Table One also shows the temporal distribution of our sample. The
sample contains cases from five years, 1991-95. The majority of our sample,
however, is drawn from three years, 1992-94. Because our sample contains
data from several different years, it minimizes the possibility that our
findings are attributable to idiosyncratic factors of a specific year.'
8
Moreover, the years in the sample are not characterized by any unusual
economic activity (e.g., recession) or interest rate behavior (e.g., high
inflation). Although one must be cautious about drawing generalized
conclusions based on a sample, the geographic and temporal dispersion of
our sample minimizes the possiblity that our results are based on sampling
idiosyncracies. We ran tests on our data and found no time-series effect. In
18. Only four cases in the sample commenced after the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106. Although the 1994 act expanded the "reasonably
necessary" test of Bankruptcy Code § 503(bXl) and required courts to consider a multifactor test
before granting professional fees from the bankruptcy estate, this amendment did not apply to cases
pending at the time of the enactment See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394,
§§ 224,702, 108 Stat. 4106,4130-31,4150. Before awarding professional fees, bankruptcy courts now
must consider a host of factors including the time spent on professional services, the amount of the
requested rates, and the complexity, importance, and nature of the problem, issue, or task addressed.
See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) to (6) (1994).
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other words, we did not find statistically significant differences for our
findings based on the year of each case.
As detailed in Panel C of Table One, we also collected data on time spent
in bankruptcy. For chapter 7, we measured time in bankruptcy from the filing
date to the closing date. A chapter 7 case is closed after the estate is fully
administered and the court discharges the trustee.19 In four cases from our
sample, the estate assets had been administered, but there had not been a
formal order "closing" the case; hence we had no closing date. For the other
ninety-four cases, we found a median time in chapter 7 of 335 days. We did
find some variation between districts: Atlanta had the shortest median time in
chapter 7 of 176 days, compared with Seattle which had the longest median
time of 468 days. Although the variation in the length of bankruptcy across
the five districts displays statistical significance near the 10% level when
measured by mean, the median differences are not statistically significant.2"
Therefore, we cannot make any conclusive statements about cross-district
variation for length of time in bankruptcy.2t (Later in this paper, we explore
the relationship between time in bankruptcy and bankruptcy costs. 22)
Turning from cases to debtors, Table Two presents mean and median
values for four characteristics of our debtors. First, total assets and business
assets measure the size of the debtors contained in our sample. These figures
were taken from schedules that accompanied each bankruptcy petition. Many
of the debtors in our sample were individuals with sole proprietorships, as
opposed to legal entities such as partnerships or corporations, and scheduled
assets of an obviously personal/consumer nature. The figures for "business
assets" exclude these personal assets and thus only represent the assets used
in the business.
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 350,(a) (1994); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 5009 (if no objection is filed
within 30 days after a chapter 7 trustee has filed a final report and account and has certified the estate
is closed, the court shall presume the estate has been fully administered).
20. Table One, Panel C reports an F-statistic and the Chi-square statistic for time in bankruptcy.
The F-statistic tests for simultaneous equality of means and the Chi-square tests for equality of
medians. Both statistics are explained in more detail infra at notes 29 and 43. The F-statistic measure
is 1.880, which represents statistical significance at the 10.1% level. The Chi-square statistic is 5.955,
which does not represent statistical significance at standard levels.
21. For chapter 7 asset cases, the GAO found a median time in bankruptcy of between 2 and 3
years. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 44. The GAO's focus on chapter 7 asset cases likely
explains the difference. By definition, these cases require collection and liquidation of the debtor's
assets and, hence, should be more complex and lengthy.
22. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 75:1207
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DEBTOR PROFILE BY DisTRicr
Table Two
(means with medians in parentheses)
All
Characteristic Districts Atlanta
Total
assets
Business
assets
Boston
Kansas
City Seattle St Louis
$211,877 $257,863 $270,535 $81,762 $115,832 $319,580
($107,602) ($96,400) ($190,024) ($61,455) ($64,782) ($127,330)
$153,880 $198,311 $164,418 $60,652 $71,893 $263,486
($42,357) ($21,000) ($68,154) ($30,900) ($30,361) ($75,752)
Total debt 5.825 4.992 5.561 6.329 9.445 3.311
/total assets (2.160) (1.915) (2.379) (2.733) (1.605) (2.333)
Current
assets23/total
assets
(14.3%) (17.8%) (1.2%) (19.2%) (22.5%) (11.6%)
(0.8%) (0.2%) (0.9%) (3.5%) (4.5%) (0.8%)
DiSmlBUTIONs BY DIsTRIcT
Table Three
(means with medians in parentheses)
Distribution All
Measure Districts
Kansas
Atlanta Boston City Seattle St Louis
Total $107,994 $96,303 $203,394
distributions ($65,615) ($70,749) ($150,080)
Unsecured
distributions/
Total
distributions
$169,055 $65,858 $70,377
($43,041) ($24,124) ($45,729)
4.6% 4.0% 0.9% 2.6% 8.1% 7.7%
(0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%)
Although the size of debtors in our sample varied considerably, the
figures suggest that our sample is representative of typical business
bankruptcies. Overall, the median total asset size in our sample was
$107,602. The median debtor deployed $42,357 of these assets in their
business enterprise.24 Based on median figures, the largest cases occurred in
23. "Current assets" is a well-known accounting concept. A "current asset" is any asset that will
be used within a year. Essentially, current assets are a firm's liquid assets. Examples of current assets
are cash, short-term invested securities, accounts receivables, and inventory. When classifying a
debtor's assets, we used these well-known definitions.
24. Outliers for asset size in the sample render the median (rather than mean) figures more
meaningful. A "mean" is merely the average for a sample, while the "median" is the sample's
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Boston, although St. Louis debtors reported slightly higher business assets.
The sample met our goal of quantifying costs for the typical bankruptcy case.
Distributions to creditors are another measurement of case size. As Table
Three shows, our average (median) case distributed $107,994 ($65,615) to
creditors. Because value can be transferred to creditors through many devices
beyond outright cash payments, we defined "distributions" quite broadly.
Thus our measurement of distributions includes transfers to secured creditors
through devices such as abandonment 5 or relief from the automatic stay. If
one attempts to measure all distributions in a bankruptcy case, one must
include these categories of distributions to secured creditors. Otherwise, the
estimate of distributions will be too low. Unfortunately, the only way to
include these distributions is to scour case files for their occurrence and, even
then, estimates have to be made.26 As we have done throughout this paper,
when we made an estimate of asset value, we used the estimate that produced
the most conservative (i.e., the lowest) measure of bankruptcy costs relative
to size.
In most cases, nothing was distributed to unsecured creditors. A few
outliers pulled each district's average to between one and eight percent, but
cases with unsecured distributions were by far the exception. The median
distribution to unsecured creditors in each district was zero. In the vast
majority of our chapter 7 business cases, the bankrupt firms had nothing left
over after paying the costs of administering the case and distributing
collateral to secured creditors. The prototype chapter 7 is the trustee's
marshaling and sale of assets to benefit all creditors not holding security.27
The data suggest this prototype is more fantasy than fact.
midpoint. An "outlier" is a point in the sample that falls far from other points in the sample, thereby
distorting the mean. For example, for a data set consisting of the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, and 90, the mean
is 20, but the median is 3. The median of 3 is a better description of the data set than the mean of 20. In
this data set, the number "90" would be described as an outlier.
25. Technically, a chapter 7 trustee abandons assets from the bankruptcy estate to the debtor's
personal holdings. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 554.02[3] (Lawrence P. King, ed., 15th ed.
1996); see also 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1994) (setting out procedures for abandonment). Despite the
technicality, abandonment often serves to surrender collateral to secured creditors. When an
abandonment was a transparent transfer to a secured creditor, we counted the abandonment as a
distribution to a secured creditor though the asset technically was going to be in the hands of the
debtor for a short period.
26. For consistency, we followed a set of rules designed to ensure the highest possible estimate
of distributions and hence the most conservative estimate of bankruptcy costs. For transfers to secured
creditors, we assumed the property transferred was equal in value to the entire amount of the debt
owed.
27. Descriptions of chapter 7 in this fashion abound in the textbooks. See, e.g., 1 DAVID G.
EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 1-7 (1992); ROBERT L. JORDAN & WILLIAM D. WARREN,
BANKRUPTCY 23-24 (4th ed. 1995); ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 245-46 (3d ed. 1996).
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The leverage (total debt/total assets) and liquidity (current assets/total
assets) figures in Table Two indicate the debtors' financial positions at the
time of filing. Not surprisingly, the debtors reported horrible financial
conditions. The firms averaged five, six, and up to nine times as much debt
as assets. Moreover, many of these debtors were illiquid, with a median
debtor having less than 1% of the firm's assets in liquid form. The lower
median values indicate that the mean values in each district were driven by
outliers, but both values are instructive here. Our sample contained debtors in
financial conditions that ranged from the horrible to the gruesome.
IV. COST MEASUREMENTS
Table Four summarizes the cost measurements that we found. As noted in
the Introduction, we needed to account for firm size. To do so, we
standardized costs against (1) the total assets reported by the debtor at filing
(Table Two) and (2) the total distributions to all creditors (Table Three). We
report costs as a percentage of these figures. In addition to controlling for
firm size, reporting costs as a percentage also has the positive effect of
obviating the need to restate costs in constant dollars to account for
inflation.2"
28. Technically, one might restate all dollar figures into constant terms, but the complexity of
such a technique outweighs its benefits. For example, if one standardizes bankruptcy costs by total
assets at filing, one might restate the costs in terms of constant dollars as of the date of filing. If the
filing were, for example, on January I, and the if the costs were paid on March 1, one would need to
restate the March 1 dollars into January 1 constant dollars.
Such short-term restating of dollar figures is unnecessary because few people would consider the
value of a dollar to have significantly depreciated over a two month period. Given that we found a
median time-in-bankruptcy of under a year, see supra Table One (reporting a figure of 335 days), our
study would have benefited only marginally from the short-term restating of dollar figures.
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AGGREGATE AND BY-DiSTicr CHAPTER 7 COSTS
Table 429
A. Cost Measures for the Aggregate Sample
Cost Measure Mean Median Max. Min.
Total costs/total assets 6.1% 1.1% 96.1% 0.0%
Total costs/total 13.5% 2.1% 100.0% 0.2%
distributions
Attorneys' fees/total assets 3.8%. 0.7% 69.9% 0.0%
Attorneys' fees/total 10.5% 1.5% 87.3% 0.0%
distributions
B. Total costs/total assets-By district
Mean Median Max. Min.
Atlanta 7.8% 1.3% 55.1% 0.2%
Boston 2.4% 0.6% 31.6% 0.2%
Kansas City 7.4% 1.7% 75.5% 0.0%
Seattle 10.5% 2.7% 96.1% 0.2%
St. Louis 2.5% 0.8% 11.8% 0.4%
F-stat: 0.980 Chi-square: 9.953
(0.423) (0.041)
29. The F-statistic in this table is a measurement of the statistical significance of the variance in
the means between the districts. Essentially, the F-statistic tests the hypothesis that the means are
equal. If the F-statistic is high enough, we can reject the notion the means are equal. Instead, with a
given level of statistical confidence, we can conclude that the variance in the means is not due to
random chance. The higher the F-statistic, the higher the level of statistical significance for the
difference between the means. The level of statistical significance is reported in parentheses below
each F-statistic. For example, the F-statistic for total costs/total assets was 0.980, meaning the
differences between the means for this measurement among districts was not very significant (only
0.423).
The Chi-square statistic is a similar measure of statistical significance between the medians for
each district. Again, the Chi-square tests the hypothesis that the medians are equal. With a high enough
Chi-square, we can reject the hypothesis that the medians are equal. The higher the Chi-square
statistic, the higher the level of statistical significance for the difference between the medians. The
level of statistical significance is reported in parentheses below each Chi-square score. For example,
the Chi-square score for total costs/total assets is 9.953, meaning that the differences between the
median among districts is significant, at the 0.041 level. In other words, there is less than a 4.1%
chance this result occurred due to random chance. Most empiricists interpret results at anything less
than the 0.05 level to be statistically insignificant. For more information about the F-statistic and the
Chi-square figure, see supra note 43.
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C. Total costs/total distributions-By district
Mean
20.1%
3.4%
8.3%
24.4%
12.2%
Median Max.
2.7%
0.7%
2.2%
8.1%
6.6%
91.6%
24.2%
66.9%
100.0%
61.9%
Min.
0.4%
0.3%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
F-stat 2.530 Chi-square 14.194
(0.046) (0.006)
Mean
5.1%
2.1%
5.3%
4.8%
1.9%
Median
1.1%
0.4%
1.1%
1.9%
0.8%
Max.
45.1%
30.8%
69.9%
22.9%
9.1%
Min.
0.1%
0.0%
0.0%
0.1%
0.2%
F-stat 0.570 Chi-square 10.718
(0.683) (0.029)
E. Attorneys'fees/total distributions-By district
Mean
15.8%
2.7%
7.1%
17.8%
9.8%
Median
1.9%
0.6%
1.7%
5.6%
5.3%
Max.
86.0%
23.6%
61.9%
87.3%
45.1%
Min.
0.2%
0.0%
0.0%
0.2%
0.4%
F-stat 1.900 Chi-square 14.674
(0.118) (0.005)
We found that chapter 7 business bankruptcy direct costs averaged $4609,
with a median figure of $1150. These costs include fees paid to professionals
(e.g., attorneys, appraisers, auctioneers) out of the chapter 7 estate, the
chapter 7 trustee's compensation, filing fees, and any other direct costs
apparent from the court record. As Table Four, Panel A reveals, these costs
averaged 13.5% of all distributions, with a median figure of 2.1%. Measured
alternatively, these costs represented an average (median) of 6.1% (1.1%) of
the debtor's total assets at filing.
We also isolated attorneys' fees as a separate cost component. For our
chapter 7 cases, these attorneys' fees included those paid to debtor's
Atlanta
Boston
Kansas City
Seattle
St Louis
D. Attorneys 'fees/total assets-By district
Atlanta
Boston
Kansas City
Seattle
St Louis
Atlanta
Boston
Kansas City
Seattle
St Louis
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counsel30 and those for the chapter 7 trustee's attorney. Attorneys' fees
averaged $3630 across our sample, with a median figure of $950. As Table 4,
Panel A shows, these figures averaged 10.5% of all distributions, with a
median figure of 1.5%. Measured alternatively, attorneys' fees represented
an average (median) of 3.8% (0.7%) of the debtor's total assets at filing.
Great variance is demonstrated by the vast disparity between means and
medians for our cost figures. The standard deviations bear this out. For
example total costs/total distributions had a mean of 13.5%, but a standard
deviation of 23.9%. Attorneys' fees/total distributions had a mean of 10.4%,
but a standard deviation of 19.9%. In three-quarters of the cases, both total
costs and attorneys' fees were less than 12% of total distributions. Thus, the
cases where chapter 7 costs tend toward the extreme are relatively
uncommon.
The variance in our data suggest that bankruptcy costs are not
unreasonably high in all chapter 7 business cases. Bankruptcy lawmakers
should give courts discretion to control costs in individual cases rather than
legislate bright-line rules that would apply to all chapter 7 business
bankruptcies. Rules restricting bankruptcy costs would be overly broad for
more than 75% of chapter 7 business bankruptcies where costs are only 1.0
to 2.0% of the business's assets and distributions.
The current bankruptcy rules more or less adopt this approach. For
example, in approving fee petitions, bankruptcy courts are directed to award,
"reasonable" compensation which reflects such factors as whether the
professional services were "necessary" or "beneficial" to the bankruptcy
estate.31  Trustee compensation is capped by statutorily-determined
percentages based on the distributions to creditors; however, within these
caps, the bankruptcy court is enjoined to award a fee that is reasonable.3 2
These general rules give bankruptcy courts discretion to deal with
individualized cases of fee abuse as our data suggest is necessary.
We calculated other cost figures not included in Table Four. Nonattomey
professional fees averaged $583; the median figure was zero, indicating that
30. We included the debtor's attorneys fees regardless of whether they were paid before or after
the case was filed. Even if the debtor firm did not pay its attorneys' fees out of the bankruptcy estate
after filing, the amount of these fees represents value that otherwise could have gone to pay creditors.
Indeed, debtors must report precisely the amount of money they have prepaid to any attorney in
connection with their bankruptcy case. See FED. R. BANKR. P. OFFICIAL FORM No. 7 (listing
Statement of Financial Affairs and question nine where debtor must report "all payments made ... to
any persons ... for consultation concerning ... relief under the bankruptcy law or preparation of a
petition in bankruptcy").
31. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (1994); see also supra note 18 (discussing factors courts are to
consider in awarding attorneys' fees).
32. See 11 U.S.C. § 326(a) (1994).
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less than half the chapter 7 cases analyzed had nonattomey professional fees.
Nonattomey professional fees averaged 1.4% of both total assets at filing and
total distributions. All other direct costs, such as filing fees and trustee fees,
averaged $370 with a median figure of $160, 33 representing approximately
1.0% of both total assets at filing and total distributions.
We also looked to see if cases converted to chapter 7 exhibited different
cost characteristics. Although we had twenty-three cases in our sample
(23.6% of our overall sample) that had been converted to chapter 7 from
other bankruptcy chapters, we found no statistically-significant differences
between the costs of these cases and the costs in nonconverted cases.
Because of more thorough data-gathering techniques, our latest figures
differ from those reported in the pilot study. In that study, we found that as a
percentage of total distributions total costs averaged 66.38% and total
professional attorneys' fees averaged 57.67%. 34 These figures contrast
sharply with the measurements of 13.5% and 10.5% reported in this study.
This variation is explained entirely by our data-gathering techniques. In
the pilot study, we used chapter 7 final reports to estimate distributions. Most
distributions to secured creditors, however, did not appear on the final report
because they came through stay relief, asset abandonments, or similar
devices. In the pilot study, chapter 7 costs were overestimated when
measured against total distributions.35 Indeed, this was one of the reasons we
omitted secured creditor distributions from several of our cost measurements
in the pilot study.36 With the resources available in this study, we were able
to bypass the final report and review actual court records for an estimate of
secured creditor distributions. Hence, the figures reported in this paper
contain more accurate information about distributions to secured creditors.
One finding of the pilot study was that very few assets reached the
unsecured creditors. Our latest findings are consistent with this conclusion.
When measured as a percentage of distributions solely to "nonsecured
creditors,' 37 bankruptcy costs averaged 92.1%, with a median figure of
33. To gain a sense of these figures, consider that for the chapter 7 cases in our study, the filing
fee ranged from $120 to $130. See 28 U.S.C. § 1930 (1994). In most of these cases, a chapter 7 trustee
fee of $45 was paid from the filing fee. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(b)(1) (1994). Thus, a median figure of
$160 suggests that, in many cases, there were few "other costs" beyond the filing fee.
34. See Lawless, supra note 4, at 863-64.
35. See id. at 859-61 (discussing limitations on secured creditor distributions as a cost
measurement).
36. See id. at 861-62.
37. We use the term "nonsecured" to describe both administrative claimants and traditional
unsecured creditors. Because secured creditors are entitled to look to their collateral in a chapter 7
case, the amount paid to administrative claimants and unsecured creditors together represents the
amount available to pay unsecured creditors.
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100.0%. This means that after removing the collateral of any secured creditor
and any exempt property belonging to the debtor from the bankruptcy estate,
an average of 92 cents of every dollar were applied to bankruptcy costs. In
over 90% of our cases, the only distributions to nonsecured creditors were
used to pay the costs of the proceeding. We found similarly high percentages
in the pilot study.38
Most bankruptcy professionals will not be shocked to hear that chapter 7
business bankruptcies do not typically involve distributions to unsecured
creditors. A 1994 GAO report studying both business and consumer chapter
7 bankruptcies found that only approximately 5% of these cases generated
some receipts for creditors.39
Before the 1978 enactment of the current Bankruptcy Code, many argued
that the judicially-oriented bankruptcy system, where every case goes to a
tribunal, should be converted to an administratively-oriented system in which
most or all cases would go to an administrative agency.40 Routine cases
would be routed to the agency, while more complex cases might be sent to
the courts.
Our data suggests that little has changed since these proposals were
initially made. A vast majority of the chapter 7 bankruptcies we studied
involved little or no distribution to creditors. The debtor gained a discharge
with no other consequences (assuming the debtor was an individual eligible
for discharge).4 '
The question still remains whether administration of routine bankruptcy
cases should be removed from the judicial branch in favor of the executive
branch. One author of this paper has criticized the judicial branch as a body
institutionally incapable of creating coherent bankruptcy law at both a
doctrinal and policy level.42 If the judicial branch cannot create logical
bankruptcy law and is instead incurring needless expense by handling routine
cases, the case for removing some of the federal courts' bankruptcy
38. See Lawless, supra note 4, at 863 (reporting that chapter 7 costs averaged 69.08% of all
distributions to nonsecured creditors with a median figure of 98.75%).
39. See GAO REPORT, supra note 16, at 1-2.
40. See COMMISSION ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT, H.R. DOC. No.
93-137, pt. I, at ch. 5 (1973), reprinted in COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY APP. B (Lawrence P. King, ed.,
15th ed. 1996); DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM
199-204 (1971).
41. The chapter 7 discharge is limited to individuals. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1994).
42. See Robert M. Lawless & Dylan L. Murray, An EmpiricalAnalysis of Bankruptcy Certiorari,
62 MO. L. REV. 101 (1997); Robert M. Lawless, Legisprudence Through a Bankruptcy Lens: A Study
in the Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (1996); Charles J. Tabb & Robert
M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions: The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist
Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 823 (1991).
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jurisdiction becomes even more compelling.
In addition to the aggregate figures, Table Four, Panels B through E,
presents a cross-district comparison of bankruptcy costs. We found
substantial cross-district variation in chapter 7 costs. Specifically, we found
that the direct costs of liquidation were lower in Boston relative to the other
districts in our sample. The variation between Boston and the other districts
was statistically significant based on 110 separate tests run on 10 different
variables. 43 No other district had statistically-significant variation from the
other districts. Therefore, despite the other variation in Table Four, Panels B
through E, we cannot say that one district was "higher" than the other
districts; we can say only that Boston was the lowest.
Across all four cost measurements, the Boston cases consistently reported
the lowest mean and median figures. The one exception was for attorneys'
fees as a percentage of total assets (Table Four, Panel D). For this figure the
Boston cases averaged slightly more than the St. Louis cases, but the
F-statistic instructs us that the variations in these means are not statistically
significant. Interestingly, the difference in median figures for this cost
measurement (i.e., attorneys' fees), where Boston does report the lowest
figures, is statistically significant Perhaps the most noteworthy difference
between Boston and the other four jurisdictions is demonstrated by total costs
as a percentage of total distributions (Table Four, Panel C). Boston reports a
median figure of under 1.0%, three times less than the next closest district.
Similarly, Boston's low figures for attorneys' fees as a percentage of
distributions (median figure of 0.6%) suggests that low attorneys' fees may
be the reason for the difference.
The finding of cross-district variation supplements the existing empirical
literature reporting substantial variations in legal cultures across different
bankruptcy courts.44 Nevertheless, the relatively lower Boston costs will
43. For the sake of brevity, these tests are not reported in this paper. For cross-district variation,
we tested for statistical significance in the variation of median values using the Kruskal-Wallis test of
simultaneous equality. This test produces the Chi-squared statistic reported in Table Four. The higher
the Chi-squared score, the higher the level of statistical significance. We tested for statistical
significance in the variation of mean values using a standard F-statistic. Again, the higher the
F-statistic, the higher the level of statistical significance. In Table Four, we report the level of
statistical significance below each statistic. Thus, in Panel C (total costs/total distributions), we report
an F-statistic of 2.530 which means statistical significance at the 4.6% level, and we report a Chi-
squared score of 14.194, which means statistical significance at the 0.6% level.
44. See Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcies, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501 (1993)
(documenting how local legal culture and attorneys can affect chapter choice for bankrupt debtors);
Teresa Sullivan et al., The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the
Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 801,passim (1994) (describing how, despite
the existence of one governing statute, practices in federal bankruptcy courts vary widely from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction).
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surprise many, as Boston does not have a reputation for inexpensive counsel.
Rather, Boston's hourly rates are among the highest in the nation. It must be
remembered that the reported figures do not represent absolute costs but
represent costs relative to the size of the estate. Essentially our figures
demonstrate that Boston processes more assets and distributions through the
bankruptcy system per dollar of costs than other districts.
Still, the question remains: why Boston? The explanation likely lies in the
legal-services market for chapter 7 bankruptcies. These cases are routinized
in many law offices, with a single attorney handling numerous chapter 7
cases at once.45 Many attorneys bill chapter 7 cases on a project basis,
charging a flat fee for shepherding a routine case through the system. In such
a competitive environment, market forces would drive down the costs of
legal services. In fact, the Boston legal market was extremely competitive
during the time period of our study,46 and it is likely that this competition
forced chapter 7 costs down relative to other markets.
The finding of cross-district variation reinforces our earlier comments
about the need for bankruptcy policymakers to imbue courts with discretion
to control bankruptcy costs. 47 Because bankruptcy costs may vary from
district to district, any attempt to control them at a national level is doomed to
be both under- and over-inclusive. Again, Congress has adopted the correct
course in Bankruptcy Code section 330 by allowing judicial discretion to
control high bankruptcy costs in individual cases.48
V. ANALYSIS OF THE COSTS
A. Scale Effect
There is some evidence of a scale effect on bankruptcy direct costs. A
scale effect would occur if the proportion of direct costs were inversely
related to the size of the firm. In other words, a scale effect occurs if as firms
grow in size the direct costs of bankruptcy decrease as a percentage of firm
45. See, e.g., Harvey Berkman, Kaplan Halves Credit Cards to Total Clients' Consumer Debts,
16 CHI. LAW., March 1993, at 4 (describing a Chicago bankruptcy attorney who helps 1000 clients
annually through chapter 7 and chapter 13 and who bills for chapter 7 on a project-basis at $800-$900
per case); see also Sullivan et al., supra note 44, at 849-51 (describing several law offices that serve as
bankruptcy "mills" and earn profits by processing many chapter 13 petitions for relatively low costs
and low profit margins).
46. See, e.g., Dick Dahl, With So Many Lawyers, What Will They All Do?, MASS. LAW. WKLY.,
July 20, 1992, at 25 (reporting that in 1992 Massachusetts had one lawyer for every 150 residents,
nearly twice the national rate).
47. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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size. The existence of a scale effect often is due to the presence of fixed costs
that can be amortized over larger volumes and thus reduce total percentage
costs. Others have found a scale effect to bankruptcy costs, including costs in
banlcruptcy liquidations, although the data have not been conclusive.49 Our
pilot study generally failed to find the existence of a scale effect for chapter 7
bankruptcy.
50
To test for the existence of a scale effect, we used the quadratic and
logarithmic regression models suggested by other scholars.51 For each model,
we estimated eight separate regressions. We used each of our four measures
for direct costs and our two measures for finm size. Specifically, we
measured firm size by both total assets and total liabilities.
REGRESSION ESTIMATES FOR A TEST OF EcONOMIES OF SCALE IN CHAPTER 7 COSTS
Table Five
A. Quadratic Function Estimates
cost = 30 + 1 *size + f2*size2
Cost Measure Size Measure Po 132
Total costs/total Total assets 0.112*** -0.000"* 0.000"*
assets Total liabilities 0.067*** -0.000 0.000
Total costs/total Total assets 0.183*** -0.000* 0.000
distributions Total liabilities 0.138*** -0.000 0.000
Attorneys' fees/total Total assets 0.067*** -0.000"** 0.000"**
assets Total liabilities 0.039*** -0.000 0.000
Attorneys' fees/total Total assets 0.136*** -0.000 0.000
distributions Total liabilities 0.103*** 0.000 0.000
49. Professor Warner found some evidence of a scale effect in his study of bankruptcy costs, see
Warner, supra note 9, at 79, but this evidence was based on a small sample of 11 firms restricted to the
railroad industry. It was not clear whether his conclusions could be applied to bankrupt firms in other
industries. Similarly, Professors Guffey & Moore found evidence of a scale effect but their sample was
limited to the trucking industry. See Guffey & Moore, supra note 9, at 233. Professors Ang, Chua, and
McConnell found a scale effect to bankruptcy costs, but their results were based on a sample from one
judicial district. See Ang, supra note 9, at 223-24.
In his comprehensive study of bankruptcy costs of publicly-traded companies generally,
Professor Weiss found no evidence of a scale effect. See Weiss, supra note 9, at 288-90.
50. See Lawless, supra note 4, at 872-73.
51. See, e.g., Ang, supra note 9, at 223; Weiss, supra note 9, at 290.
1227
01
Washington University Open Scholarship
1228 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
B. Logarithmic Function Estimates
log(cost) = 13o + P31*log(size)
Cost Measure Size Measure 13o PI
Total costs/total Total assets 3.815*** -0.695**
assets Total liabilities -1.337 -0.224
Total costs/total Total assets 0.279 -0.319**
distributions Total liabilities -3.114 -0.024
Attorneys' fees/total Total assets 3.578** -0.692**
assets Total liabilities -3.252* -0.092
Attorneys' fees/total Total assets 0.396 -0.343**
distributions Total liabilities -5.009** 0.112
*** significant at the 1% level
** significant at the 5% level
* significant at the 10% level
Table Five, Panel A reports the results from the quadratic model for a test
of economies of scale in bankruptcy costs. If there is a scale effect, the
coefficients on the linear variable (3I) should be positive and statistically
significant, while the coefficients on the squared variable (032) should be
negative and statistically significant The coefficients, however, generally
have signs opposite to that consistent with a scale effect and lack statistical
significance. Thus the quadratic model fails to provide evidence of a scale
effect in chapter 7 bankruptcy.
Panel B reports the results of the logarithmic model for a test of
economies of scale. The presence of a scale effect requires that the
coefficient on the logarithm of the size variable be statistically significant,
and lie between 0 and 1. Our estimates, however, are uniformly negative and
significant only for the asset measure of size.
When combined with the results from the quadratic model, the
logarithmic model does not support the presence of a scale effect. Based on
this finding, our pilot study, and other studies, we conclude that there are
generally no economies of scale in direct costs for the everyday chapter 7.
Economies of scale might be present in the rare instance of a large, publicly
traded business chapter 7, but not in the mine-mn chapter 7 case.
This conclusion finds support in the structure of the marketplace and legal
regulation for chapter 7 costs. As mentioned before, many chapter 7
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attorneys bill on a "project basis," meaning that they charge one flat fee
regardless of the size of the case.52 Although billing on a "project basis"
might initially seem to lead to the conclusion that a scale effect should be
present, the size of the average chapter 7 case does not allow the scale effect
to appear. As an economist might note, the average chapter 7 case falls on the
"fiat" portion of the cost curve. Perhaps in extremely large cases, an attorney
might depart from project billing and charge a higher fee, but these
exceptions apply only in cases larger than those in our sample.
Also, one component of chapter 7 costs is the trustee fee set by statute.
53
Until 1995, in cases with distributions over $3000, the chapter 7 trustee fee
was capped at 3%.54 Because many of our cases took place prior to and
during 1994, the 3% cap would mean the cases would not exhibit a scale
effect for trustee's fees. Beginning with the passage of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, the 3% cap does not become effective until the case has
$1,000,000 in distributions. Future researchers should test whether this new
law will create a scale effect for chapter 7 cases.
Our finding that no scale effect exists, however, suggests that Congress
acted soundly in 1994 when it lifted the 3% cap. By capping out trustee
compensation at 3% for amounts over $3000, the pre-1994 law essentially
assumed that economies of scale began at that amount. Our research shows
that economies do not exist at this amount and, indeed, do not start until
much larger figures are reached.
B. Determinants of Bankruptcy Direct Costs
We used multiple regression methodology to examine the effect upon
chapter 7 costs by the various case characteristics. A multiple regression
allows us to test the nature and the strength of the relationship between an
independent variable (a characteristic of the case) and a dependent variable (a
cost measure). We estimated sixteen regressions, four for each of the four
cost measures. The results are depicted in Table Six. Blank spaces indicate
that a particular variable was not run in that regression. The sign of the
coefficient for each variable indicates whether it is positively or negatively
related with bankruptcy costs. The adjusted R2 indicates the accuracy of fit
for our model. For example, an adjusted R2 of 0.17 tells us that our model
explained 17% of the variation in the cost figure (i.e. the dependent variable)
52. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
53. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 326,330(1994).
54. See 11 U.S.C. § 326(a)(1988).
55. See 11 U.S.C. § 326(a) (1994).
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examined in that regression.
We identified six case characteristics that might have an effect on
bankruptcy costs. First, we tested the relationship for time in bankruptcy. We
hypothesized that the longer the time in bankruptcy, the greater the costs
would be. This hypothesis is consistent with criticisms of bankruptcy that it
"takes too long."56 In addition, common sense would suggest that as a
bankruptcy case drags out, the more likely it is that costs will increase.
Our next variable was the size of the debtor's attorneys' law firm.
Conventional wisdom suggests that some law firms are more expensive than
others regardless of quality. The belief is that nonlawyers are poor judges of
legal talent and tend to hire based upon other qualities. We wanted to test for
differences in cost based on the characteristics of the law firms involved. For
chapter 7, this meant testing based on the characteristics of the debtor's
attorneys' law firm. A common view is that the larger the firm, the more
expensive the firn will be. Therefore we hypothesized that law firm size
would be positively related to bankruptcy costs.
We also examined case characteristics that suggest complexity. First, we
tested the relationship between the ratio of unsecured debt to total debt and
bankruptcy costs. With a greater percentage of unsecured debt outstanding, it
is more likely that conflicts will arise between unsecured and secured
creditors. More conflict would suggest higher attorneys' fees and overall
costs, which would render disputes less likely to settle. We hypothesized that
the ratio of unsecured debt to total debt would be positively related to
bankruptcy costs.
The variables for the average size of an unsecured claim and a secured
claim similarly capture case complexity. We hypothesized that as the average
size of an unsecured claim increased in absolute terms, so would bankruptcy
costs. We also hypothesized that as the average size of a secured claim
increased in absolute terms, conflict would be more likely to arise and
bankruptcy costs would increase.
Our final measure of case complexity was the number of claims disputed
by the debtor. While the ratio of unsecured to total debt measured conflicts
between creditors, the number of disputed claims measured conflicts between
the debtors and their creditors. As disputed claims increased, we would
expect conflict to increase, with a concomitant increase in bankruptcy costs.
The regression models revealed that the significant factors explaining
56. See, e.g., Samuel L. Bufford, Chapter 11 Case Management & Delay Reduction: An
Empirical Study, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85 (1996); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with
Chapter 11, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 729; James J. White, Harvey's Silence, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 467
(1995).
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chapter 7 costs are time in bankruptcy and the ratio of unsecured to secured
debt Both of these variables were statistically significant in a number of
different regressions. Thus both time and complexity partially explain
chapter 7 costs.
5 7
It was interesting that our inter-creditor dispute variable (ratio of
unsecured to total debt) was significant, while our debtor-creditor dispute
variable (number of disputed claims) was not. One might expect that disputes
between creditors would not generate significant costs for the debtor. The
tension between secured and unsecured creditors that characterizes
bankruptcy practice obviously exerts a contaminating effect on the debtor's
costs. The lack of significance for disputed claims may be the result of the
relatively small number of cases in our sample with disputed claims.
We did not find a significant relationship between the average size of an
unsecured or secured claim and chapter 7 costs. The absence of a relationship
between the size of a creditor's claim and costs is not surprising given our
conclusion that chapter 7 costs lack a scale effect. Also, we did not find a
relationship between the size of the debtor's law firm and any of our cost
measurements.
The regression results also are important because of what they suggest
about the cost measurements. Generally, the statistically significant results
occurred when costs were measured by total distributions and not by total
assets. Although other explanations are plausible, these results support the
notion that total assets are not as reliable a cost measure as total distributions.
57. In our pilot study, we did not find a statistically significant relationship between time in
chapter 7 bankruptcy and direct costs. See Lawless, supra note 4, at 878. The more extensive data-
gathering techniques in this study likely explain the difference. With the resources available for this
study, we were able to better quantify distributions to secured creditors and, hence, our distribution-
based measures are more accurate. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (explaining this study's
treatment of secured creditors). Because the pilot study did not use these more thorough techniques,
perhaps it was unable to detect the relationship.
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Total assets are based on the amount of assets reported by the debtor at
the time of filing and are often distorted or inaccurate. A bankrupt firm
estimates the value of its assets and reports that figure. The figure may be
used later in the bankruptcy proceedings as a starting point to value the
debtor's assets. Depending on the debtor's financial and legal situation, a
debtor may have the incentive to overestimate or underestimate the value of
its assets5 Moreover, even a debtor who attempts to make a good-faith
estimate of value still only takes a best guess. Many small-business debtors
lack the incentive or the resources to undertake a reliable appraisal of their
assets.
On the other hand, total distributions is a more objective figure. Total
distributions simply represents the amount actually distributed to creditors. If
the debtor has correctly estimated its assets at filing, then total distributions
should equal total assets at filing, but the practical considerations that prevent
accurate asset valuations ensure such equality never occurs.59 One must
estimate total costs against total assets only with caution. These findings are
consistent with findings in the pilot study.60
Our findings on the determinants of chapter 7 costs have important
implications for bankruptcy courts reviewing fee chapter 7 fee applications.
The data show that the ratio of unsecured to secured debt plays an important
part in determining banlruptcy costs relative to assets and distributions. The
size of the case, the size of the claims, and the number of disputed claims do
not play a significant role. The ratio of unsecured debt to secured debt is
certainly beyond the control of the professionals participating in the case and
therefore may serve as a good factor for bankruptcy courts to weigh in
reviewing fee applications. The statute appears to allow for this inquiry as it
directs bankruptcy courts to consider the "complexity ... of the problem,
issue, or task addressed" by the professional seeking compensation. 61 The
percentage of unsecured debt involved in a chapter 7 bankruptcy is a good
proxy for the case's overall complexity.
Our findings suggest the opposite for fee petitions brought by
professionals who have caused delay in a case. Delay becomes a significant
factor in increasing chapter 7 costs. Interestingly, the Bankruptcy Code does
not explicitly require bankruptcy courts to penalize professionals who cause
58. See Lawless, supra note 4, at 858-59 (discussing the incentives debtors have to understate
and overstate asset valuation at filing).
59. Consider that our average debtor reported approximately $212,000 in total assets but only
$108,000 in total distributions. See supra Tables Two and Three.
60. See Lawless, supra note 4, at 856-62, 865.
61. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(aX3)(D) (1994).
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delay in a bankruptcy case. The authorization is there, however, as the
Code's list of guidelines is nonexclusive, and directs the bankruptcy court to
consider all relevant factors.62 To control chapter 7 costs, bankruptcy courts
should penalize professionals who cause delay. Of course not every delay in
a case will be unjustified, but the results of this study suggest to minimize
costs courts should closely monitor chapter 7 cases that are characterized by
delay.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has provided a quantitative baseline against which to assess
chapter 7 business liquidations. To summarize our major findings:
Costs in chapter 7 business cases average approximately 13.5% of
all distributions. The median figure was 2.1%, suggesting a few
chapter 7 cases end up "out of control" in terms of costs.
Bankruptcy policymakers concerned about chapter 7 costs should
focus on these outlier cases rather than impose stricter regulation on
all cases. Attorneys' fees account for the majority of bankruptcy
costs, averaging 10.5% of all distributions with a median figure of
1.5%. Extrapolating, chapter 7 business liquidations cost the
economy approximately $35 to $41 million per year.
* For chapter 7, distributions are a better measure for bankruptcy
costs than assets at filing. When measured as a percentage of the
debtor's total assets at filing, chapter 7 direct costs averaged
(median) 6.1% (1.1%) and chapter 7 attorneys' fees averaged
(median) 3.8% (0.7%). However, the results of our regression
analyses were more statistically robust for distribution-based
measures of bankruptcy costs than for asset-based measures of
bankruptcy-costs. Also, in small-business bankruptcies, asset-based
measures are susceptible to the debtor's biases and reporting errors.
For these reasons, distribution-based measurements are better for
estimating chapter 7 costs than asset-based measurements because
they are less subject to measurement error.
" Chapter 7 cases vary significantly across districts. We found
statistically significant cross-district variation in bankruptcy costs.
Among the five districts we studied, we found Boston to have
statistically significant lower chapter 7 bankruptcy costs. Boston
62. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3) (1994).
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direct costs averaged less than half of the costs in the other districts.
As with our finding on costs generally, this finding suggests that
costs can vary from case to case and district to district. Again,
bankruptcy policymakers should adopt rules that give bankruptcy
judges more discretion to control fees in individual cases, rather
than enact overly broad rules that regulate fees across the board.
" Chapter 7 business cases involve negligible recovery for unsecured
creditors. Very few assets were paid to unsecured creditors. After
subtracting distributions to secured creditors, an average of 92 cents
of every dollar went to pay the costs of the chapter 7 proceedings in
our study. In over 90% of the cases in our study, the only
distributions beyond those to secured creditors went to pay chapter
7 costs. Reality does not comport with the prototype chapter 7
debtor that liquidates his, her, or its assets and pays creditors from
the proceeds. In most chapter 7 business cases, the debtor is being
run through the system for a discharge.63 These data resurrect the
proposals calling for a federal administrative agency to assume
jurisdiction over routine bankruptcy cases.
" No scale effect for chapter 7 We found no evidence of a scale
effect to chapter 7 bankruptcy costs. Combined with the results
from our earlier pilot study and from other studies, we conclude that
there are no economies of scale for direct costs in the typical
chapter 7 case. Such economies, if they exist, must occur only in the
rare instance of the extremely large chapter 7 case.
* Delay and complexity determine costs. We found statistically
significant relationships between chapter 7 costs and time in
bankruptcy. We also found statistically significant relationships
between the chapter 7 costs and the ratio of unsecured debt and total
debt. In reviewing fee petitions, bankruptcy courts should consider
cases with a high ratio of unsecured to total debt as a complex case
and negatively consider the fee applications of professionals who
delay a case.
Because these findings represent some of the only data available for the
typical chapter 7 business filer, they constitute an important step toward
achieving an understanding of business bankruptcies. One note of caution,
63. Of course, this would not be true for the chapter 7 cases where the debtor is a non-individual
business entity such as a corporation or partnership. Non-individuals may not receive a bankruptcy
discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1994).
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however, is in order. Because we included only business cases, our results
may not be generalizable to consumer chapter 7 cases.
The findings support and challenge existing law. First, the data emphasize
the importance of allowing bankruptcy courts discretion to control the costs
in business chapter 7 cases. Costs in chapter 7 business bankruptcy
proceedings are not out of control across the board or across the country.
Attempts to control costs at a general, national level are doomed to be under-
and over-inclusive.
Second, we found chapter 7 business bankruptcies to be characterized by
routine; over 90 percent of our cases involved no distributions beyond
payment of direct costs. These figures challenge the bankruptcy system at a
systemic level, calling into question the need for judicial-branch handling of
what are run-of-the-mill cases.
Our data support some conceptions about chapter 7 business bankruptcies
and explode some popular myths. Where appropriate, we have made a
number of specific recommendations, and of course, we hope bankruptcy
policymakers heed this advice. But the data hold more importance than these
specific issues. Debates over bankruptcy policy should be measured against
real-world experience and not some fictionalized ideal. By quantifying the
costs of chapter 7 business bankruptcy, this article provides the starting point
from which these debates should begin.64
64. Professors Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook have undertaken a comprehensive empirical
study of business reorganizations. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Searching for
Reorganization Realities, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1257 (1994). When finished, this study will provide
further quantitative data to guide policymakers in creating this nation's bankruptcy laws.
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